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To antitrust devotees, 1990 was the centenary of the Sherman Act.
To the New Zealand public it marked 150 years of nationhood. But
more significantly for present purposes, it witnessed the achievement of
free trade between two South Pacific neighbors, Australia and New Zea-
land. With justifiable pride, one Australian legal official could boast that
this:
achieve[s] an international first in free trade in goods between two coun-
tries. Free trade will not be accomplished in Europe until 1992 or some
time later under the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. 1
This article examines some antitrust aspects of the Australia-New
Zealand free trade accord. The first section will trace the development of
trans-Tasman2 free trade, noting the long history of efforts to liberalize
trade between the two countries. The next part analyzes the role anti-
trust law played in the movement to free trade. The final two sections
raise a number of outstanding issues and problems yet to be resolved by
Australia and New Zealand policy makers.
* LL.B. (Hons), LL.M. (Canterbury); Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Otago, Dunedin,
New Zealand; Fulbright Senior Scholar, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berke-
ley, 1991. This article was the basis of an address given at the 1991 Fulbright Scholars Symposium,
Challenges for the World Legal Order: The Final Decade of the Twentieth Century, on April 10, 1991
at Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco.
1 Brazil, The Developing Closer Economic Relationship Between Australia and New Zealand, in
FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW CONFERENCE PAPERS 309, 313 (Canberra 1989).
2 The term "trans-Tasman" is shorthand for matters pertaining to both Australia and New
Zealand. The Tasman Sea is the body of water separating the two countries. A synonymous term I
will also use is "Australasia," Le Australia plus New Zealand.
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANS-TASMAN FREE TRADE
That a free trade agreement should be struck between two neighbors
sharing such common ancestry, language and culture is hardly surpris-
ing.3 To most outsiders, Australians and New Zealanders seem identical.
Indeed, until 1841 New Zealand was a dependency of New South Wales,
Australia's most populous state. Perhaps the only surprising thing is
that bilateral free trade should have taken so long. It has not been for
want of trying.4
The first formal trans-Tasman trade agreement dates to 1922. This
provided for preferential tariff treatment on 129 items. In 1933, all tariff
rates between the two countries were harmonized with British rates. As
a measure of wartime solidarity, the Australia-New Zealand Agreement
was signed in 1944 to solidify cooperation between the two nations in
respect to their developing economies. Shortly thereafter, both countries
became members of GATT in 1947.
Trade relations were further formalized in the mid-1960s when the
Governments signed the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement
Treaty (NAFTA) which came into force in 1966. Despite its title,
NAFTA never achieved full free trade. Although from its inception a
substantial proportion of tariffs on trans-Tasman trade were removed,
and bilateral trade soared some 800% in the next fourteen years, its lim-
its eventually became apparent. Principally, NAFTA suffered from the
inability of negotiators to move goods not originally exempted into the
free trade area of Schedule A.5
Commencing with a joint communique in March 1980 by the Prime
Ministers of each country, momentum gathered for some sort of closer
economic relationship, one which would benefit each in the face of an
increasingly hostile world economy. Such a relationship would build
upon earlier legislative efforts while assuming the continuance of the spe-
cial kinsman-like relationship between the two countries. The result of
all this was the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA or simply CER) which came into force
on January 1, 1983.6 The objectives of the CER treaty were:
3 As the former New Zealand Prime Minister recently observed: "New Zealand and Australia
have a unique relationship. No other pair of neighbouring countries have been touched by so little
distrust or mutual suspicion." Palmer, International Trade Blocs - New Zealand and Australia:
Beyond CER, I PUB. L. REV. 223, 223 (1990).
4 The following brief historical treatment is drawn from Brazil, supra note 1, at 311-313 and A.
BOLLARD & M. THOMPSON, TRANS-TASMAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1 (1987).
5 A. BOLLARD & M. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 1.
6 Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, Australia-New Zealand, 22
I.L.M. 948 (in force as of Jan. 1, 1983) [hereinafter CER].
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(a) to strengthen the broader relationship between Australia and New
Zealand;
(b) to develop closer economic relations between the Member States
through a mutually beneficial expansion of free trade between New Zealand
and Australia;
(c) to eliminate barriers to trade between Australia and New Zealand in a
gradual and progressive manner under an agreed timetable...; and
(d) to develop trade between New Zealand and Australia under condi-
tions of fair competition.
7
Specifically, the Treaty articulated the need for progressive reduction and
elimination of tariffs,8 quantitative import restrictions,9 revenue duties, 10
export subsidies and incentives, 1 and preferential treatment for domestic
suppliers on government purchasing. 2
On the legal side, it was thought that existing business laws were
sufficiently dissimilar that freer trade might well be hindered, and thus
Member States should:
examine the scope for taking action to harmoni[z]e requirements relating to
such matters as standards, technical specifications and testing procedures,
domestic labelling and restrictive trade practices.'1
I shall return to harmonization of trans-Tasman commercial laws in the
next section.
The Treaty, despite a relatively lukewarm reception at the time,
nonetheless saw a significant expansion in trade: trade between the two
nations doubled in the following five years." At the end of that period
the Treaty itself provided for a review of its operation. Dellow and Feil
comment:
It is in part a testament to the success of the relationship that by the time
this review was required the immediate objective of the treaty had been
largely implemented, with tariffs on nearly all items traded between the two
countries reduced to nil. New Zealand import licensing and Australian
quota requirements had also been largely removed in relation to trans-Tas-
man trade.1
5
Since the Treaty had already exceeded expectations, the Prime Min-
isters of each country, Mr. Hawke (Australia) and Mr. Lange (New Zea-
7 CER, supra note 6, at art. 1, quoted in Farmer, Towards a Single Trans-Tasman Market: A
Lawyer's Perspective, 33 WORLD COMPETriON L. & ECON. REv. 39, 40 (1988).
8 CER, supra note 6, at art. 4, para. 3.
9 Id. at art. 5, para. 3.
10 Id. at art. 7, para. 2.
11 Id. at art. 9, para. 1.
12 Id. at art. 11, para. 1.
13 Id. at art. 12, para. 1 (a).
14 Waineymer, International Trade and Investment, 18 AUSTL. Bus. L. REv. 267, 267 (1990).
15 Dellow & Feil, Competition Law and Trans-Tasman Trade, in COMPETITION LAW AND POL-
ICY IN NEW ZEALAND 25 (R. Ahdar ed. 1991).
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land), resolved at their meeting in November 1987 that further
acceleration was warranted. They set three goals for the 1988 CER
Review:
(a) to bring forward the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on
goods from 30 June 1995 to the early 1990s;
(b) to examine the Australian and New Zealand business environments to
identify those laws, regulations or other government interventions that con-
stitute impediments to free trade, and examine ways of removing such im-
pediments through harmoni[z]ing approaches in these areas; and
(c) to consider extending the scope of ANZCERTA to cover trade in
services. 1
6
The Review was completed in August 1988, resulting in the Proto-
col on Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods signed August 18, 1988. The
middle of 1990, specifically July 1, 1990, was fixed as the date for full free
trade in goods, thereby hastening the process by five years. The Protocol
addressed such matters as extension of the Treaty to trade in services and
the harmonization of quarantine and customs procedures. With respect
to anti-dumping, the Protocol urged a bold departure from tradition.
While anti-dumping action by the respective Member States was not ab-
solutely prohibited under the 1983 Treaty, the original Agreement did
obligate each country to exchange information and consult prior to the
imposition of dumping duties. Further, the Treaty had stated that
dumping was "inconsistent with the objectives of this Agreement." 17
The 1988 Protocol in its preamble now suggested:
that the maintenance of anti-dumping provisions in respect of goods
originating in other Member States ceases to be appropriate as the Member
States move towards the achievement of full free trade in goods between
them and a more integrated market.
Reservations that complete abolition of anti-dumping would go too
far were answered in the following way. Unfair international trading
would now be addressed by domestic competition law suitably modified
to proscribe predatory conduct by overseas corporations affecting trans-
Tasman trade. The date for both abolition of anti-dumping and exten-
sion of existing Australasian competition laws would be the same: July
1, 1990. The precise mechanics of these changes are set forth in the next
part.
One final aspect of the 1988 Review is worth brief mention. The
two governments entered into a Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Austra-
lia on Harmonization of Business Law. This Memorandum once again
16 Id at 26.
17 CER, supra note 6, at art. 15, para. 1.
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urged careful consideration of national laws which might impede trade
and recommended yet further harmonization.
The Review's extension of the Treaty to services and coverage of
such matters as quarantine restrictions was welcomed. However, there
are still some outstanding matters. Dellow and Feil point to perhaps the
most important gap:
[T]he two governments could not agree on a free investment regime. While
the operation of overseas investment rules create few problems at present,
in the past they have been a significant impediment to trans-Tasman invest-
ment. The absence of an agreement securing a free investment regime is a
significant potential cause of tension in the closer economic relationship. It
results in the curious situation that the developing group of trans-Tasman
enterprises that have substantial shareholdings and operations on both sides
of the Tasman, may, for the purposes of the respective foreign investment
regulation regimes, be treated as foreign companies in both countries.
18
Hopefully the next review of the Treaty, set for 1992, will address this
issue. 19
III. ANTITRUST LAWS: THEIR ROLE IN THE FURTHERANCE OF
FREE TRADE
Recall that the promulgators of the 1983 Treaty were concerned
that differences in the respective laws of the Member States might im-
pede the closer economic relationship. Major changes to the competition
laws of New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Australia, henceforth en-
sued. These changes can be analyzed in two distinct phases.
A. Phase One: Harmonization of Trans-Tasman Competition Law
Article 12(1)(a) of the CER Agreement obliged the two nations to
"examine the scope for taking action to harmoni[z]e requirements relat-
ing to... restrictive trade practices." As things stood in 1983, Australia
and New Zealand had markedly different antitrust regimes.2' From 1974
when it enacted the Trade Practices Act, Australia had an avowedly pro-
competition policy. The courts were the principal forum for enforcing
the law and private individuals or firms could seek redress. In short, the
Australians endeavored to reproduce the U.S. antitrust laws in an Aus-
tralian social and economic setting.
By contrast, antitrust in New Zealand was still modelled on the
18 Dellow & Feil, supra note 15, at 27.
19 But see Australia, New Zealand Continue Process ofAchieving Closer Relations, 60 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1517, at 732 (May 23, 1991) (harmonization of foreign investment not
on the agenda).
20 See Farmer, supra note 7, at 39 for a brief summary.
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cumbersome United Kingdom system with its unwieldy administrative
machinery and absence of private enforcement. Moreover, the objective
of the legislation was not competition as such but a diverse range of
"public interest" goals such as industrial development, export trade, and
employment enhancement. New Zealand antitrust was in the doldrums.
Harmonization does not necessarily mean replication,21 yet in the
context of trans-Tasman trade this is what largely occurred. Comparison
of the two systems yielded the inescapable conclusion that New Zealand
should adopt the Australian system and not vice versa. Thus the New
Zealand Parliament passed the Commerce Act 1986, which came into
effect on May 1, 1986.22 The New Zealand legislation adopted in large
measure the antitrust provisions of the Australian Trade Practices Act
1974.23 A companion New Zealand statute, the Fair Trading Act 1986,
likewise adopted the Australian federal consumer protection laws.
B. Phase Two: Extraterritorial Extension of Domestic
Competition Laws
The movement to abolish anti-dumping laws with respect to goods
originating from each other's country by July 1, 1990 did not stand
alone. It was felt that some controls over unfair international trade prac-
tices were still required. The rather doctrinaire view that removal of
trade barriers would eliminate the incentive or scope for dumping was
rejected. Accordingly, policy makers seized upon existing domestic com-
petition laws. With minor amendments, domestic antitrust could ad-
dress problems of trans-Tasman predation.
The principal focus of change was the monopolization provisions
contained in section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia) and
section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 (New Zealand). The New Zealand
provision reads:
36(1) No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that
position for the purpose of-
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive con-
duct in that or in any other market; or
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market.2 4
Section 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act is substantially similar.
One difference, however, is the threshold standard for illegality. Section
21 Farrar, Harmonisation of Business Law Between Australia and New Zealand, 19 VIcTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 435, 445 (1989).
22 Commerce Act, N.Z. Stat., no. 5 (1986).
23 Trade Practices Act, AUsTL. ACms P., no. 51 (1974).
24 Commerce Act, supra note 22, at sec. 36, para. 1.
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46 of the Australian Act speaks of the firm having a "substantial degree
of power in a market" instead of having a "dominant position in a
market."
Given the previous harmonization of the respective monopolization
prohibitions, modification to meet problems of trans-Tasman misconduct
by powerful enterprises was quite straightforward. The antitrust laws
would apply to firms having dominance not just in, for instance, the New
Zealand market but also persons possessing a dominant position in an
Australian market or a combined trans-Tasman market. Thus, on July
1, 1990, the same day that anti-dumping legislation in New Zealand was
amended to abolish measures with respect to goods of Australian ori-
gin,25 the Commerce Amendment Act 199026 came into force. Specifi-
cally, a new section 36A became operational. This provision, entitled
"Use of dominant position in trans-Tasman markets," reads:
36A(l) No person who has -
(a) A dominant position in a market; or
(b) A dominant position in a market in Australia; or
(c) A dominant position in a market in New Zealand and Australia-shall
use that person's dominant position for the purpose of-
(d) Restricting the entry of any person into any market, not being a mar-
ket exclusively for services; or
(e) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive con-
duct in any market, not being a market exclusively for services; or
(f) Eliminating any person from any market, not being a market exclu-
sively for services . *...27
Australia likewise introduced a new section 46A when it passed the
Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power) Act 1990,28 on
the same date that Australian anti-dumping measures ceased with re-
spect to New Zealand goods.29
There was still one more important amendment remaining. Each
country's antitrust statute contained a provision purporting to give the
legislation some extraterritorial effect; both were worded similarly. To
take New Zealand's again, 0 section 4(1) of the Commerce Act stated:
25 The Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act 1988 was amended by the Dumping and Coun-
tervailing Duties Amendment Act 1990.
26 Commerce Amendment Act, N.Z. Stat., no. 41 (1990).
27 Id. at title 15.
28 Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power) Act, AusrL. ACTS P., no. 70, § 8
(1990).
29 The amended Australian anti-dumping statutes were the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act
1975, the Customs Act 1901 and the Anti-Dumping Authority Act 1988. See Waincymer, supra
note 14, at 270, for a discussion of what Australia deems to be goods produced or manufactured in
New Zealand.
30 Australia's equivalent provision was section 5 of the Trade Practices Act, supra note 23. For
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This Act extends to the engaging in conduct outside New Zealand by any
person resident or carrying on business in New Zealand to the extent that
such conduct affects a market in New Zealand.31
The requirement that persons had to be resident or carrying on busi-
ness in New Zealand obviously did not sit well with the new section 36A
proscribing misconduct by persons dominant in Australian markets. Ac-
cordingly, the extraterritorial sections of each nation's Acts were
amended. Thus, the Commerce Amendment Act 1990 added section
4(2):
Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, section 36A of this Act ex-
tends to the engaging in conduct outside New Zealand by any person resi-
dent or carrying on business in Australia to the extent that such conduct
affects a market, not being a market exclusively for services, in New
Zealand.3 2
Finally, to ensure that the extended jurisdiction would operate
smoothly in practice, ancillary amendments were made both to the anti-
trust legislation as well as to other related statutes dealing with evidence,
procedure, and enforcement of judgments. In New Zealand, the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1990 amended provisions of the
Judicature Act 1908, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act
1934, and the Evidence Act 1908. Parallel changes also occurred in Aus-
tralia.33 Some highlights are, from a New Zealand perspective, a provi-
sion for:
the New Zealand High Court to sit in Australia in appropriate circum-
stances; ... judicial notice to be given to seals and signatures of the [Austra-
lian] Trade Practices Commission and [Australian] Federal Courts; the
[Australian] Trade Practices Commission ... [to] act as a "conduit" for
transmission of information and documents required by the [New Zealand]
Commerce Commission in the exercise of its functions under s. 36A; and
the New Zealand justice system to support sittings of the [Australian] Fed-
eral Court in New Zealand, including punishing for contempt of the Fed-
eral Court while it is sitting in New Zealand.34
It should be noted that the enforcement agencies on both sides of the
Tasman, the Trade Practices Commission (Australia) and the Commerce
Commission (New Zealand), have maintained a close working relation-
the amended version, see Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power) Act, supra note
28, at § 6.
31 Commerce Act, supra note 22, at § 4, para. 1.
32 Commerce Amendment Act, supra note 26, at title 5.
33 The Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market Power) Act 1990 amended the Federal
Court of Australia Act 1976 and the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1905.
34 Dellow & Feil, supra note 15, at 38 and 42.
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ship for several years.3 5 In the wake of the new trans-Tasman monopoli-
zation provisions, the Commissions recently issued a joint statement.36
Reflecting the closer "enforcement" relationship, the statement explains
that each Commission will (resources permitting), on behalf of the other
Commission, undertake any "preliminary investigations of fact" neces-
sary to determine whether a potential defendant has the threshold mar-
ket power in its home country to warrant contravention proceedings.
37
For example, the Trade Practices Commission would, at the request of
the Commerce Commission, investigate an Australian corporation al-
leged to have breached section 36A to see if it has a dominant position in
an Australian market.
Naturally, in the short period since the changes above were imple-
mented, neither country has seen much litigation. The only instance thus
far has been an unsuccessful bid for an interlocutory injunction by an
Australian company under section 46A.38
IV. COMPARING ANTITRUST TO ANTI-DUMPING POLICY
[T]here is a clear difference in policy between competition law and anti-
dumping law. Anti-dumping laws aim to protect competitors. Anti-trust
laws aim to protect competition. The latter are only interested in effects on
individuals if those effects can be related to competition per se. On the
other hand anti-dumping laws are not interested in whether conduct is
competitive or not in the wider sense but merely whether there is material
injury to a domestic industry or the threat of such injury arising out of
dumping.39
It is commonplace to allude to the different goals of antitrust and
anti-dumping law. To the extent that a domestic monopolist or oligo-
polist invokes trade relief or countervailing duties against a more efficient
foreign competitor, trade policy might be a vehicle to undermine compe-
tition policy. However, the point should not be pushed too far. As the
quotation above recognizes, even antitrust law is prepared to protect an
individual enterprise if this is necessary to stimulate competition in the
market as a whole.4 In certain carefully circumscribed situations, anti-
35 Id. at 37. The authors go on to discuss the future use of cross-membership to enhance co-
operation between the two agencies. Id. at 38.
36 Enforcement of New trans-Tasman Competition Laws, t. Statement by the New Zealand
Commerce Comm'n and the Australian Trade Practices Comm'n, reprinted in Appendix 6 of the
TRADE PRACTICES COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 117-120 (1989-90).
37 Id. at 120.
38 Berlaz Pty Ltd. v. Fine Leather Care Products Ltd., (1991) A.T.P.R. (CCH) 1-118.
39 Waincymer, supra note 14, at 271 (emphasis added).
40 See Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd. v. Port Nelson Ltd., [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 662, 700,
where McGechan J. observed: "Such provisions [as section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986] are di-
rected at protection of the concept of competition as such. They are not directed at the protection of
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trust is prepared to protect the weak from the strong, to entertain notions
of fairness.'" Thus, as with all generalizations, caution is required.
There is certainly no dispute that antitrust and anti-dumping laws
invoke different institutional frameworks and remedies.4 2 Enforcement
is now in the hands of the respective antitrust Commissioners rather than
customs officials. The remedies also differ. Instead of the imposition of
additional duties up to the level of the "dumping margin," antitrust law
sees a broader range of available remedies such as damages, injunctions,
and pecuniary penalties.
A central question is this: is antitrust law, suitably modified, able to
catch the kind of unfair international trading conduct which the anti-
dumping laws addressed? There are strong grounds for thinking
otherwise.43
Antitrust law of course knows nothing of dumping. But it is accus-
tomed to combatting the evils of so-called "predatory pricing." This re-
fers to the use of short-run price-cutting at a loss in the hope of driving
out rivals and raising prices again in the long run. Judge Breyer in a
helpful U.S. decision explains:
a profit maximizing firm might sometimes find it rational to engage in pred-
atory pricing; it might do so if it knows (1) that it can cut prices deeply
enough to outlast and to drive away all competitors, and (2) that it can then
raise prices high enough to recoup lost profits (and then some) before new
competitors again enter the market.44
Dumping can be seen as a kind of international monopolization by
means of predatory pricing. Theoretically then, the monopolization pro-
visions of current antitrust legislation, designed to combat predatory
pricing, should be modifiable to effectively combat dumping. This, as we
have seen already, is what the Australian and New Zealand policy mak-
ers did. Section 46 of the Australian Act and section 36 of the New
Zealand Act were given extraterritorial effect.
Is the analogy a sound one however? Is dumping simply interna-
tional predatory pricing? An examination of the two immediately reveals
some key differences. First, predatory pricing, at least in U.S. antitrust
jurisprudence, requires the notion of below-cost sales, although there is
individual competitors, except in so far as the latter may promote the former." Id. at 700 (emphasis
added).
41 For example, much group boycott and resale price maintenance law is explicable only in these
terms.
42 See Dellow & Feil, supra note 15, at 39-40.
43 "[it can be stated with assurance that it will be much more difficult to attack transactions
under competition law than was the case under anti-dumping laws." Waineymer, supra note 14, at
271.
44 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 1983).
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great debate on which cost (marginal? average variable?) and how it can
be measured.45 However, as Applebaum points out:
there is no requirement that dumping or subsidies involve below-cost sales.
Indeed, the more routine, garden variety dumping case is a price-to-price
comparison between the foreign market and the United States market that
does not consider cost at all.46
Secondly, the defendant in monopolization proceedings must pos-
sess substantial market power (Australia) or a dominant market position
(New Zealand).47 This is not a prerequisite for anti-dumping law.
Thirdly, anti-dumping concentrates on the effects of the defendant's con-
duct: whether prices abroad are greater than those at home and whether
material injury is suffered by local producers. By contrast, sections 36A
and 46A are drafted in terms of purpose. Dominant firms are caught if
they use their economic strength "for the purpose of" eliminating rivals,
deterring entry, etc. The defendant's purpose, however, may be estab-
lished by inferences from conduct.48 Nonetheless whether the intended
effects eventuate is not strictly relevant. Thus, the elements to success in
monopolization proceedings are quite different and by no means easy to
satisfy.
That predatory pricing is a difficult allegation to sustain in antitrust
litigation is borne out by recent events both in Australasia and the
United States. In the United States, the Supreme Court in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.49 was skeptical of the entire
doctrine. Influenced by Chicago School thinking, the Court commented
that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried and even more rarely
successful."5 There is an understandable reluctance on the part of
courts to condemn large firm pricing behavior as "predatory" when it
may be no more than healthy price competition.51
45 For a recent summary of the voluminous literature, see Nagarajan, The Regulation of Preda-
tory Pricing Within S.46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 18 AusTL. Bus. L. REV. 293 (1990).
46 Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 412 (1987).
47 For discussion of this threshold requirement and in particular whether the Australian thresh-
old represents a lower standard than New Zealand's, see Hampton, Section 36(1) of the Commerce
Act 1986: An Analysis of its Constituent Elements, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN NEW
ZEALAND 186-189 (R. Ahdar ed. 1991). It should be noted that both section 36A and section 46A
apply to single enterprises who possess significant market power. The predatory actions of a group
of competitors possessing collective market power would appear to be beyond the reach of the Act.
See Dellow & Feil, supra note 15, at 36.
48 See Hampton, supra note 47, at 204-212.
49 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
50 Id. at 589.
51 "[C]utting price in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition. Thus,
mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct
the antitrust laws are designed to protect." Id. at 594.
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In Australia and New Zealand, predatory pricing cases have been
rare.12 New Zealand has not seen any cases, and Australia has seen only
two: one, an interim injunction application where the issue was can-
vassed by the High Court very briefly;53 the other, where a plausible situ-
ation of predatory pricing was rejected by the Federal Court. The latter
decision, Trade Practices Commission v. C.S.B.P. & Farmers Ltd., 54 pro-
voked dismay among enforcement officials and eventually led to an
amendment of section 46 to ease the evidentiary burden upon plaintiffs."5
Prevention of predatory pricing in recent antitrust law has a decid-
edly poor track record. There seems no reason why it should be pro-
scribed any more easily or frequently in the international context. Quite
the opposite. Claims of price predation where defendant and victim are
geographically distant, where variables such as exchange rate fluctua-
tions impinge and where potential entrants may spring from third coun-
tries to thwart recoupment by the defendant,56 suggest predatory pricing
is even more implausible in an international as opposed to a domestic
setting. One illustration seems particularly apposite here.57 Again, it is
the Matsushita case. Television manufacturers in the United States foun-
dered under the Sherman Act in their claim that Japanese manufacturers
had conspired to predatorily price television sets in the U.S. market. Yet
earlier in 1971, U.S. manufacturers successfully sued Japanese television
producers under U.S. anti-dumping law.5 The clear implication is that
it may be more difficult to combat unfair trading under antitrust law than
under anti-dumping law.
If antitrust law is a weaker weapon than anti-dumping, does it really
matter? There are two arguments here that suggest this loosening of con-
trol over unfair international trade is acceptable. The first is theoretical.
A free trade market is simply one not conducive to dumping:
Removal of trade barriers will... render dumping largely redundant as the
scope for price discrimination between the domestic and export markets (a
pre-condition for dumping) is reduced. In essence, the establishment of a
free trade area under ANZCERTA will substantially reduce the incentives
and ability for exporters to dump because of the risk of retaliation by com-
52 See Nagarajan, supra note 45, at 320-324, for a full discussion.
53 Victorian Egg Mktg. Bd. v. Parkwood Eggs Pty Ltd., 33 F.L.R. 294, 303 (1978).
54 53 F.L.R. 135 (1980).
55 See Hampton, supra note 47, at 209-210.
56 "In the global market, without an oligopolist or monopolist position, a predator who ulti-
mately increases price after smashing a local competitor, will simply see importers change their
source of supply." Waineymer, supra note 14, at 271-272.
57 See Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 12 WORLD
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REv. 83, 85 (1989).
58 Color Picture Tubes from Japan, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 367, Inv. No. 731 TA 367-370 (1971).
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petitors including the possibility of arbitrage ......
The second argument emphasizes the recent history of trans-Tas-
man dumping cases. The anti-dumping laws themselves were not pro-
scribing much dumping since the CER Agreement came into force.6°
New Zealand, for example, saw some thirty-nine dumping complaints
lodged between 1983 and 1988 against Australian firms. Only two of
these resulted in a finding of dumping.6 Australian statistics are simi-
lar.62 The anti-dumping laws had become largely redundant even before
full free trade materialized. Their abolition and replacement with a
weaker form of control (antitrust) thus represents little change.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRANS-TASMAN NATIONS
AND THIRD COUNTRIES
It is the early days for trans-Tasman free trade and it will be inter-
esting to see the effects within the Australasian market. Equally interest-
ing, and possibly more problematic, are the issues arising with respect to
third countries. I shall briefly sketch four areas worth further
consideration.
A. Third Country Dumping
The anti-dumping regimes of each Member State remain in place to
counter dumping from third nations. A number of distortions and com-
plications could ensue. Speaking from an Australian perspective,
Waincymer notes:
The potential for dumping duties remains on all other third country im-
ports into Australia. The changes will simply mean that those industries
who face trans-Tasman competition have had their levels of effective pro-
tection reduced compared to other Australian industries. That is an unde-
sirable feature of the change. 63
He goes on to suggest:
To remove anti-dumping duties from one source can only lead to inefficient
resource allocation if importers of products sensitive to anti-dumping com-
plaints shift their sources of supply from efficient third country suppliers to
59 Brazil, supra note 1, at 315. See also Dellow & Feil, supra note 15, at 36. For a contrasting
view, see Nicolaides, Does the International Trade System Need Anti-Dumping Rules?, 14 WORLD
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REv. 103, 105 (1990) (dumping and free trade have no direct or neces-
sary connection).
60 Keyte & Rennie, Changes in Anti-Dumping Laws, NEw ZEALAND TRADE DEv. BOARD Ex-
PORT NEWS, Feb. 1991, at 21.
61 Id.
62 Of 34 cases from 1982 to 1988, only three resulted in the imposition of an anti-dumping duty.
Id.
63 Waincymer, supra note 14, at 272.
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less efficient New Zealand suppliers.6
The ultimate solution to such problems is the universal abolition of anti-
dumping regimes and replacement with extraterritorial antitrust law by
all nations. However, as Waincymer recognizes, 6 and he is surely cor-
rect, such a multilateral accord seems a long way off, if attainable at all.
B. Exemptions for Pure Export Cartels
A blindspot in the antitrust regimes of many nations, even the
United States,66 is the immunity granted to pure export cartels: arrange-
ments between local firms to restrict competition between them but
which affect foreign buyers and consumers, not domestic consumers.
This nationalistic approach to antitrust enforcement has received mount-
ing criticism recently. M6schel states the case nicely:
What is clear from the international practice of exempting pure export car-
tels from the application of domestic competition law is essentially a tradi-
tional "beggar my neighbor" policy. It leads to a paradoxical situation: if
you stand up in the movies, you have a better view; if everyone does it,
nobody is better off.67
Neither Australia nor New Zealand is blameless in this regard
either. Each has a virtually identical export cartel immunity.6 8 For ex-
ample, section 44(l)(g) of the New Zealand Commerce Act exempts con-
tracts containing provisions that relate "exclusively to the export of
goods from New Zealand or exclusively to the supply of services wholly
outside New Zealand" if various procedural steps are observed.
These export-directed exemptions have been overlooked in the re-
cent legislative amendments. Certainly an exemption for export cartels
seems just as inconsistent with the objective of free trans-Tasman trade as
do anti-dumping laws, at least where the goods and services are bound
for the other Member State's shores. Moreover, if single firm anticompe-
titive conduct can now be caught notwithstanding that its impact occurs
overseas, why should concerted behavior not likewise be proscribed by
Australasian antitrust law?69 Even if this apparent anomaly were to be
addressed within the trans-Tasman context, the issue still remains with
respect to third nations. New Zealand might, for example, exempt ex-
64Id.
65 Id. at 273-74.
66 See the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1988), and the Export-Trading Company
Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1988).
67 Mdschel, International Restraints of Competition: A Regulatory Outline, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 76, 83 (1989).
68 The Australian provision is section 51(2)(g) of the Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 23.
69 Remember that both sections 46A and 36A are directed at a corporation or a person, not
corporations or persons, who uses market power for predatory purposes.
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port cartels where a nation other than Australia: is involved. Further-
more, even if both Australia and New Zealand were to entirely abolish
their respective export arrangement exemptions, they would face a world
where these stubbornly persist. Again, the only solution seems to be
some form of concerted multi-lateral agreement that such immunities
from domestic antitrust are beyond the pale.7'
C. Other Problems with the Extraterritorial Operation
of Antitrust Laws
Policy makers in Australia and New Zealand have made it clear that
each country's extended antitrust legislation applies to the Crown and
Crown corporations. Thus New Zealand, for instance, inserted two ex-
press provisions into the Commerce Act in 1990: section 6A, which states
that section 36A applies to Australian Crown corporations (and the
Crown itself); and section 6B, which eradicates any immunity for the
New Zealand Crown and Crown bodies corporate in respect of section
46A of the Australian Act.71 Hence doctrines of sovereign immunity
have been explicitly rejected in the trans-Tasman context.
What about the extraterritorial application of third countries' anti-
trust laws to Australia or New Zealand, in particular U.S. antitrust laws?
This has been a very hot topic for some time. As one U.S. commentator
recently observed:
For most of the past century, the United States was the Lone Ranger of
international antitrust with application of US law outside the territory of
the United States often very unappreciated by foreign governments.72
That comment is an understatement when one considers the Austra-
lian experience with U.S. antitrust in the late 1970s. The full saga is a
long and interesting one but is unfortunately beyond the scope of this
article.7 a In brief, the U.S. firm Westinghouse commenced proceedings
in the United States against some twenty-nine foreign uranium produ-
cers, including four Australian companies, alleging various cartel behav-
ior in contravention of the Sherman Act. Under the so-called "effects
70 Professor Hawk suggests that "consumers worldwide would be better served by all countries
applying antitrust laws rather than selectively applying them to promote each country's perceived
'net national welfare'." Hawk, The International Application of the Sherman Act in its Second Cen-
tury, 59 ANTrrRUST L. J. 161, 166 (1990).
71 Commerce Amendment Act 1990, supra note 26, at § 6.
72 Hawk, supra note 70, at 161.
73 For an excellent account and one I have drawn from here, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, AUSTRALIAN-UNITED STATES' RELATIONS: THE EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAWS, ch. 3 (Austl. Gov't Publishing Serv., Nov. 1983)
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE].
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doctrine" promulgated by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa,74 the Sherman
Act was seen to apply to foreign behavior having direct and substantial
effects on U.S. import, export or domestic commerce. The Westinghouse
claim was for treble damages totalling nearly $ US 6 billion! A special
Australian Parliamentary Committee, established in 1983 to consider the
problem of the extraterritorial operation of U.S. laws, summarized the
ensuing developments:
Despite firm Australian representations to the US Administration opposing
US attempts to regulate the legitimate activities of Australian companies,
the US Administration and courts showed no serious concern for Austra-
lia's expressed interests. It was not until the Foreign Antitrust Judgments
(Restriction of Enforcement) Act was enacted in 1979 that the Westing-
house case was settled out-of-court, even then involving over $11,000,000
payable by the Australian defendants (together with their extremely high
legal Costs). 75
To smooth relations in this area, the United States, as it has done
with other countries,7 6 entered into a cooperation agreement with Aus-
tralia. On June 29, 1982, the two governments signed the Agreement
between the Governments of Australia and the United States of America
Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters. However, this provision
for inter-government consultation was still seen as inadequate to assuage
lingering Australian concerns that its national interests were not being
sufficiently protected.77 Two years later, Australia enacted a revised ver-
sion of its 1979 "blocking legislation ' 7 including the introduction of so-
called "clawback" provisions, designed to enable Australian defendants
to recover the non-compensatory portion of multiple damages awarded
to foreign plaintiffs.
Although New Zealand has not had a Westinghouse-type claim, it
too followed suit and enacted blocking legislation in 1980. 79 Unlike Aus-
tralia, however, neither a cooperation treaty with the United States nor
the passing of clawback provisions has so far resulted.
Certainly with respect to one another, Australia and New Zealand
have ensured that their blocking statutes will have no effect after July 1,
1990 in relation to proceedings under sections 36A and 46A.80 However,
74 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
75 JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 73, at 27.
76 Namely Canada and West Germany.
77 JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 73, at 65.
78 Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, AusTL. ACTS P., no. 51, § 10 (1984).
79 See Evidence Amendment Act 1980, N.Z. Stat., no. 6, § 48h (1980), which enables the Attor-
ney General to intervene and restrict the production of evidence for use by foreign authorities where
this would be prejudicial to the sovereignty of New Zealand or prejudice its trading, commercial or
economic interests.
80 See, e.g., Commerce Amendment Act 1990, supra note 26, at § 6C.
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there has been no alteration of the blocking legislation with respect to
third nations. In view of the Westinghouse saga there would seem little
reason to abandon it, especially in light of the European Court of Jus-
tice's recent decision"1 to similarly adopt an effects doctrine with respect
to the European Community.
To complete this present discussion, it should be noted that both
Australian and New Zealand antitrust statutes purport to have extrater-
ritorial effect. The reach of the statute is limited to situations where the
corporation is resident or carrying on business in New Zealand or Aus-
tralia as the case may be. 2 Hence overseas firms with no direct business
connection to the nation in which their anticompetitive actions are felt
are beyond reach.
New Zealand and Australia, to my knowledge, have yet to flex their
extraterritorial antitrust muscle. This is hardly surprising in a world in
which it faces much larger, more powerful nations and, in the case of
New Zealand at least, foreign corporations with assets far in excess of the
New Zealand GDP. 3
D. What are the Implications for Pacific Rim Trade?
The CER agreement has been successful in stimulating greater
trans-Tasman trade. However, a quick survey of the 1990 International
Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics indicates that neither nation
has an exclusive preoccupation with the other. Indeed, the figures for
June 1990 show New Zealand ranked only fourth as an export market for
Australian products, taking only a fifth as much (in dollars terms) as
Japan, Australia's most popular foreign market.8 4 As an importer to
Australia, New Zealand similarly ranked well down behind the United
States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 5
The same June 1990 figures show that from New Zealand's perspec-
tive, Australia looms much larger as both an export market and an im-
81 A. AhIstrom Osakeyhitio v. EEC Comm'n, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 5193, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4,491 (1988) (The Wood Pulp Case).
82 See the Commerce Act 1986, supra note 22, at § 4, and the Trade Practices Act 1974, supra
note 23, at § 5.
83 New Zealand's real GDP was NZ $58.66 billion in 1987, or US $35.2 billion. See OECD,
ECONOMIC OUTLOOY 97 (Dec. 1990). By contrast, based on 1989 figures, the nine largest American
industrial corporations all had assets exceeding this, with the biggest three well in excess of $100
billion (General Motors, $173 billion; Ford, $160 billion; General Electric $128 billion). See For-
tune 500 1990 Directory of US Corporations 10.
84 The five largest export markets for Australia in June 1990 were in US dollars: Japan 829.2 m;
United States 366.9 m; Korea 205.5 m; New Zealand 176.6 m; and Singapore 123.3 m. See I.M.F.,
Direction of Trade Statistics 18 (Oct. 1990).
85 Id.
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porter.86 This is understandable as New Zealand seizes its opportunities
for free trade with its much larger, more populous neighbor.87
The relatively small size, in global terms, of the combined Australa-
sian market (twenty million people) means that neither nation can afford
to become too introspective. Each needs to continue to trade heavily
with third countries. Currently, the bulk of Australia's and New Zea-
land's trade is with the Pacific Rim, principally the United States, Japan,
Korea, China and Singapore.88 I see nothing in the emergence of trans-
Tasman free trade to curtail this.
V. CONCLUSION
Quietly but surely, Australia and New Zealand have set about devel-
oping bilateral free trade, an objective achieved in July 1990. Protection-
ist barriers and anti-dumping controls in relation to trans-Tasman trade
are gone. Antitrust law, often seen as being at odds with trade policy,
has been relied upon as a back-up mechanism to ensure that the goals of
free trade are not undermined by international predatory conduct. Only
time will reveal whether this imaginative Australasian experiment in in-
ternational trade will prove successful. For those who aspire to freer
trade on a global basis, one hopes the South Pacific experience will not let
them down.
86 Id. at 98.
87 The trade balance between the two countries, traditionally heavily in Australia's favor, has
now reached near parity. Palmer, supra note 3, at 226.
88 I.M.F., supra note 84, at 18-19.
